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STRUCTURING MULTICLAIM LIDGATION: 
SHOULD RULE 23 BE REVISED? 
William W Schwarzer* 
Class actions have become a prominent feature of the litigation 
landscape. The class-action device is now employed in a wide vari-
ety of type~ of litigation, including consumer, securities, antitrust, 
employment, civil rights, and institutional-reform litigation, and in-
creasingly in mass-accident, product-liability, and toxic-tort litiga-
tion. But as class actions have become more prominent, they also 
have come under increasing scrutiny because of their impact on 
parties and others and because of the magnitude of the stakes. As 
courts confront the difficult issues class actions raise, scholarly com-
ment and criticism abound, and political controversy rages. All of 
this has led to close examination of the fountainhead of class-action 
jurisprudence, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
has raised the question whether it should be revised. 
The question can be approached from diverse perspectives. For 
example, those whose interests are in mass-tort litigation likely will 
take an entirely different approach from others who are interested 
in consumer litigation or civil rights litigation or securities litigation. 
As Professor Edward Cooper has observed, the arguments for and 
against amending Rule 23 rest on assumptions about how well it 
works, or does not work, now.1 But judgments about how well the 
Rule works necessarily turn on one's expectations, and the expecta-
tions of those litigating in different fields differ greatly. 
The question whether Rule 23 should be revised therefore is not 
susceptible to a global answer unless revision is stylistic only, lim-
ited to making the text more elegant - and even stylistic revision is 
likely to have some substantive impact, even if unintended. But if 
the argument for revision is that the Rule is in some respect defi-
cient and should be made to work better, one must begin by an-
swering the question how it should work. That in tum depends on 
defining the Rule's purpose - what it is intended to accomplish. 
* Senior United States District Judge, Northern District of California; Director, Federal 
Judicial Center, 1990-95. - Ed. Alexandra Petrich assisted in the preparation of this paper. 
1. See Edward H. COoper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process 3 (Apr. 21-22, 
1995) (unpublished paper prepared for Research Conference on Class Actions, on file with 
the New York University School of Law). 
1250 
March 1996] Rule 23 1251 
This paper examines briefly the purposes for which the Rule was 
adopted in 1966 and the purposes to which it since has been put. It 
then discusses how different purposes call for different class-action 
regimes, that is, how the regulation of a class action must reflect the 
objectives for which it is invoked. It concludes by considering how 
these differences may be best accommodated: whether by revising 
the Rule or by greater reliance on the existing structuring devices 
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and improved practices 
under the Rule. 
!. PURPOSES OF RULE 23 
Before deciding whether to fix the Rule, one should determine 
whether it is broken - is it working as it should? That, of course, 
depends on what its purpose is - and that is a question not suscep-
tible of a simple and inclusive answer. 
The present Rule is the product of the revision adopted in 1966. 
The purpose of that revision, as reflected in the Advisory Commit-
tee's note, was to clarify the availability of class actions in various 
situations and simplify the Rule's application.2 Professor Benjamin 
Kaplan, the Advisory Committee's reporter, wrote that the revision 
of Rule 23 was prompted by "[ d]espondency over the inadequacies 
of [the] rule."3 According to Kaplan, "[t]he class action device ... 
had become snarled," and the "essential task" of the Advisory 
Committee "was to redefine the conditions for maintaining the fully 
effective action. "4 The members of the Committee were of the 
opinion that some litigation "affecting numerous persons 'naturally' 
or 'necessarily' called for unitary adjudication."5 To this end, the 
2. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note (Proposed Amendments 1966) [here-
inafter Advisory Committee's Note], reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 69, 98 (1966). 
The categories of class actions in the original rule ... 
. . . proved obscure and uncertain .... 
Nor did the rule provide an adequate guide to the proper extent of the judgments in 
class actions .... 
[In addition,] the original rule did not squarely address itself to the question of the 
measures that might be taken during the course of the action to assure procedural fair-
ness, particularly giving notice to the members of the class .... 
The amended rule describes in more practical terms the occasions for maintaining 
class actions; provides that all class actions maintained to the end as such will result in 
judgments including those whom the court finds to be members of the class ... and 
refers to the measures which can be taken to assure the fair conduct of these actions. 
39 F.R.D. at 98-99. 
3. Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HA.'1.v. L. REV. 356, 386 (1967). 
4. Id. at 385-86. 
5. Id. at 386. 
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Committee attempted to "rebuild the law on functional lines re-
sponsive to those recurrent life patterns which call for mass litiga-
tion through representative parties."6 
Professor Judith Resnik has characterized the Advisory Com-
mittee's motivation, as evidenced by unpublished correspondence 
exchanged by the members of the Committee, as "permeated by 
'pragmatism.' Memos and letters invoke the need or absence of 
need for class actions in the context of specific cases. "7 Of these, 
one of the most clearly described in the Committee's note is the 
23(b )(2) action for injunctive relief in cases of racial discrimination. 
As Committee member John Frank has put it in his historical over-
view of the Rule, "If there was a single, undoubted goal of the [Ad-
visory Committee on Civil Rules], the energizing force which 
motivated the whole rule, it was the firm determination to create a 
class action system which could deal with civil rights and, explicitly, 
segregation. "8 
The available evidence strongly suggests that the dominant pur-
pose of the 1966 amendment was to "enable" litigation both by cre-
ating an effective enforcement mechanism under 23(b )(2), 
primarily for civil rights cases, and by facilitating the prosecution of 
small claims susceptible of group adjudication but otherwise un-
economical to litigate, such as consumer and environmental claims. 
Professor Kaplan indicated that the two aims of the class-action de-
vice were to reduce duplicative actions and "to provide means of 
vindicating the rights of grol;lpS of people who individually would be 
without effective strength to bring their opponents into court at 
all."9 Professor Charles Joiner, another member of the Committee, 
spoke approvingly of Rule 23 as providing "additional safeguards to 
the unrepresented. "10 As the Supreme Court later explained in 
Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper: 
The aggregation of individual claims in the context of a classwide 
suit is an evolutionary response to the existence of injuries unreme-
6. Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. lNDus. & CoM. L. REv. 497, 497 {1969). 
7. Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation," LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs., Summer 1991, 
at 5, 13 n.32. 
8. John P. Frank, Thirty Years of Class Actions in Historical Prospective 3 (Apr. 28, 1994) 
(unpublished paper, on file with the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, United States Judi-
cial Conference). 
9. Kaplan, supra note 6, at 497. According to fonner Judge Marvin Frankel, Kaplan em-
phasized the class action's "historic mission of taking care of the smaller guy." Marvin E. 
Frankel, Amended Rule 23 From a Judge's Point of View, 32 ANTITRUST L.J. 295, 299 {1966). 
10. Charles Joiner, The New Civil Rules, 40 F.R.D. 359, 367 {1966); see also Phillips Pe-
troleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) (describing Rule 23's ability to facilitate effec-
tive representation for absent plaintiffs). 
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died by the regulatory action of government. Where it is not econom-
ically feasible to obtain relief within the traditional framework of a 
multiplicity of small individual suits for damages, aggrieved persons 
may be without any effective redress unless they may employ the 
class-action device.11 
One purpose the drafters did not have, however, was to create a 
device for the aggregation of multiparty litigation. That type of liti-
gation still lay largely in the future.12 Even mass-tort cases - or 
"mass-accident" cases as they were known then13 - such as 
airplane-crash and hotel-fire cases, were thought to be beyond the 
Rule. As the Advisory Committee's note put it, "[a] 'mass acci-
dent' resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not ap-
propriate for a class action because of the likelihood that significant 
questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses to liabil-
ity, would be present, affecting the individuals in different ways."14 
Far from wanting to facilitate aggregation, the members of the 
Committee were concerned lest defendants use the Rule to create a 
collusive class and, by settling, largely escape liability.15 
Nevertheless, with the passage of time, the Rule acquired a new 
gloss. Lawyers and judges, many of the latter initially quite hostile 
to class actions,16 began to look to Rule 23 to meet a felt need for 
an aggregation device as mass litigation proliferated. Judge Joseph 
Weis observed in 1986 that "[a]lthough that [Advisory Committee] 
11. Deposit Guar. Natl. Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980). In a footnote, the 
Court added: 
A significant benefit to claimants who choose to litigate their individual claims in a 
class-action context is the prospect of reducing their costs of litigation, particularly attor-
ney's fees, by allocating such costs among all members of the class who benefit from any 
recovery. Typically, the attorney's fees of a named plaintiff proceeding without reliance 
on Rule 23 could exceed the value of the individual judgment in favor of any one 
plaintiff. 
445 U.S. at 338 n.9. 
12. Although the electrical-equipment antitrust litigation involving numerous substantial 
individual claims against equipment manufacturers was then underway, there is no indication 
that class-action treatment was considered as a means for aggregation of those cases. That 
litigation, instead, provided the impetus for the multidistrict coordination statute, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1407 (1968). 
13. See Resnik, supra note 7, at 9. 
14. Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 2, 39 F.R.D. at 103. Professor Kaplan ex-
plained that the point was not 
that after determination of common questions the individual claimants might have to 
come in and prove their damages, [but rather] that in accident cases the realities of 
litigation will often suggest that the class action device is not "superior" to more com-
monplace devices; in some of these cases, moreover, individual questions of liability and 
defense will overwhelm the common questions. 
Kapl?Jl. supra note 3, at 393 (footnote omitted). 
15. See Frank, supra note 8 (manuscript at 4-5). 
16. See, e.g., Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 236-39 (9th Cir. 1974) 
(Duniway, C.J., concurring), cen. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975). 
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statement continues to be repeated in case law, there is growing 
acceptance of the notion that some mass accident situations may be 
good candidates for class action treatment."17 Use of Rule 23 to 
aggregate claims that could be litigated economically on an individ-
ual basis and where estoppel was less significant than in civil rights 
and small-claims actions, such as claims arising out of mass torts, 
however, was remote from the drafters' purpose to enable and facil-
itate litigation. It also posed the very danger of collusive actions 
and settlements the drafters feared. Still, the inexorable pressures 
of mass-tort litigation on courts and parties have legitimated to 
some degree the application of the class-action device. 
An additional purpose of class actions, probably implicit in what 
the revisers said and did, was to promote efficiency and economy. 
The class action became a case-management device for minimizing 
duplicative activity in the adjudication of related claims, for exam-
ple, in institutional-reform or discrimination cases, involving claims 
more limited in scope and potential impact than mass-tort litiga-
tion.1s As such, it also serves as an effective vehicle for public-
interest litigation, furthering the enforcement of statutory policies 
heavily dependent on private initiative.19 
While this enumeration of purposes is not necessarily exhaus-
tive,20 it suffices to make the point. Rule 23 is being used to serve a 
range of different purposes, and, as discussed below, different pro-
17. In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1008 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub nom. 
Celotex Corp. v. School Dist., 479 U.S. 852, cert. denied sub nom. National Gypsum Co. v. 
School Dist., 479 U.S. 915 (1986); see also Central Wesleyan College v. W.R. Grace & Co., 6 
F.3d 177, 181-82 {4th Cir.1993) (arguing for liberal application of Rule 23 to mass-tort cases); 
In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 725-38 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 
(1989); Bruce H. Nielson, Was the 1966 Advisory Committee Right?: Suggested Revisions of 
Rule 23 to Allow More Frequent Use of Class Actions in Mass Tort Litigation, 25 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 461, 462-83 (1988) (reviewing instances of applications of Rule 23 to mass-tort 
litigation). 
18. See, e.g., Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 701 {1979) (approving class action for 
attack on the recoupment procedures used by the Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare and commenting that "the class-action device saves the resources of both the courts 
and the parties by permitting an issue ... to be litigated in an economical fashion under Rule 
23"). 
19. See Frank, supra note 8 (manuscript at 3); see also Six Mexican Workers v. Arizona 
Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1990) (enforcing the Farm Labor Contractor Regis-
tration Act). 
20. The purposes of the Rule have been summarized as 
the efficient resolution of the claims or liabilities of many individuals in a single action, 
the elimination of repetitious litigation and possibly inconsistent adjudications involving 
common questions, related events, or requests for similar relief, and the establishment of 
an effective procedure for those whose economic position is such that it is unrealistic to 
expect them to seek to vindicate their rights in separate lawsuits. 
7A CHAru..Es A. WRIGHT ET. AL., FEDERAL PRAcnCE AND PROCEDURE § 1754, at 49 (2d ed. 
1986). An additional purpose, according to one court, was to function as a "deterrent for 
those who engage in complicated and imaginative rather than straightforward schemes to 
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cedures are necessary and appropriate to serve those purposes. 
This leads to confusion and even conflict in the application and ad-
ministration of the existing Rule. If the Rule were revised to serve 
one purpose well, say, to facilitate aggregation in mass-tort cases, it 
could not be expected to serve as well when invoked for a different 
purpose, say, consumer-claim litigation. 
One problem with much of the current scholarly comment and 
critique of the Rule is that it ignores this reality. Authors tend to 
focus on the application of the Rule to meet their particular needs 
or interests, disregarding the impact of their proposals on the 
Rule's ability to accomplish other purposes.21 They tend to disre-
gard the generic character of the Rule in its present form and the 
multiplicity of interests and needs it must be made to serve. Most 
importantly, they ignore the risk that accommodating particular in-
terests will likely diminish the utility of the Rule to serve other 
interests. 
II. CONFLICTING PURPOSES 
It is not necessarily objectionable for a rule of procedure to 
serve a number of different purposes. But the unique character of 
class-action litigation, in which named parties represent the inter-
ests of members of a judicially authorized class, creates a potential 
for conflicts among those interests that needs to be accommodated. 
Depending upon the nature of the class and its claims, this accom-
modation may need to be done in a variety of ways. Thus expecta-
tions of the class-action device will vary with the nature of the 
particular litigation in which it is employed. 
As noted, the original purpose of the 1966 Rule primarily was to 
enable litigation of numerous related small claims, such as those 
commonly found in consumer, securities, and antitrust actions.22 
The salient characteristics of these kinds of class actions are: 
(1) Individual claims are generally too small to permit plaintiffs to 
prosecute them individually. 
inflate stock prices." Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 903 n.19 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 
429 U.S. 816 (1976). 
21. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 
95 CowM. L. REv. 1343 (1995); Nancy Morawetz, Underinclusive Class Actions (Mar. 31, 
1995) (unpublished paper prepared for Research Conference on Class Actions, on file with 
the New York University School of Law); Alan B. Morrison & Brian Wolfman, Representing 
the Unrepresented in Class Actions Seeking Monetary Relief (Mar. 23, 1995) (unpublished 
paper prepared for Research Conference on Class Actions, on file with the New York Uni-
versity School of Law). 
22. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
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(2) Common questions predominate strongly over any individual is-
sues permitting adjudication of liability and damages in a single-class 
trial even if a mechanism for allocation of the proceeds from a judg-
ment must be devised. 
(3) Opt-out rights and protection against claim preclusion are there-
fore relatively unimportant as are elaborate notice provisions that 
would ensure that every potential class member is notified; indeed, 
because their cost may be an obstacle to maintaining such an action, 
they may be counterproductive and frustrate the enabling purpose of 
class treatment.23 
These kinds of class actions, on the other hand, present a greater 
need for control against overenf orcement because costs, especially 
attorneys fees, may become disproportionate to the amounts at 
stake and the benefits to individual class members. Since individual 
plaintiffs have little to gain from the action, there is also a risk that 
lawyers, rather than clients (who may only be nominal clients), will 
control the litigation with the ethical problems that can follow.24 
These problems are of particular concern in the context of settle-
ment when the benefits to lawyers may appear wholly out of pro-
portion to those received by individual class members. On the 
other hand, judicial oversight of the settlement may be less urgent 
here; because the exposure is generally less threatening to the de-
fendant than in mass-tort litigation and because the predominance 
of common over individual issues makes a class-action trial feasible, 
trial is a realistic alternative to settlement for the parties. 
Application of Rule 23 for the purpose of claim aggregation oc-
curs in an entirely different context, usually in multiparty litigation 
involving substantial claims, frequently but not always mass-tort 
claims. The salient characteristics of such class actions are: 
(1) Claims are large enough to permit individual plaintiffs to prose-
cute them separately; moreover, significant issues often may affect in-
dividual plaintiffs in different ways. 
(2) Because individual autonomy is a significant interest, protection 
against preclusion and of the choice to litigate individually is impor-
tant; effective notice procedures and opt-out rights are therefore 
critical. 
(3) Because the size, number, and complexity of claims will strain the 
resources of the parties and the court, duplicative activity - discov-
ery, motions, and rulings on common issues - needs to be reduced 
by class treatment of common questions. At the same time, courts 
must avoid precipitous and premature resolution of issues that would 
23. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 161-69, 173-76 (1974). 
24. Cf. Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 
469, 502-05 (1994). Such considerations contributed to the recent adoption of the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737. 
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dispose of the entire litigation. Pretrial procedures need to allow for 
the development of a record adequate both to assess the bases for 
claims and defenses and to resolve the complexities presented by this 
kind of litigation, whether they be questions of scientific evidence or 
choice-of-law or jurisdiction issues.25 
The precise impact of these features on the use of Rule 23 will 
vary with the particular nature of the litigation. Mass-tort actions 
range across a wide spectrum, differing in their manageability and 
susceptibility to class-action treatment. On one end are those aris-
ing out of a single event, where the class is clearly defined, its mem-
bers (more or less) identifiable, and common issues predominate. 
Next are actions based on the use of a defective product, where the 
nature of the harm is readily ascertainable, but the separate events 
and the membership of the class are not. Manageability here will 
turn on the number and ascertainability of claimants and the degree 
of information about the characteristics and effects of the product. 
The most problematic type of class action involves toxic-tort claims, 
where uncertainty surrounds both the fact and effect of exposure; 
the manifestation of injury may be long delayed, and the potential 
appearance of future claimants makes it impossible to ascertain the 
membership of the class.26 
In applying Rule 23 to multiclaim litigation such as mass-tort 
actions, the critical question is whether common issues predominate 
sufficiently to support class treatment. Because proof of individual 
injury is an essential element, class-wide adjudication may be prob-
lematic, and class actions may be more suitable as vehicles for set-
tlement than for adjudication. As a result, in applying Rule 23 to 
mass-tort litigation, the principal concern has been over settlement 
classes and the issues they raise: the adequacy of representation of 
the various interests on the plaintiffs' side, the protection of the de-
fendants' interests and those of the public, and the standards and 
procedures for court approval of settlements.21 
Finally, class actions play a role in litigation that can benefit 
from the economies and efficiencies class treatment offers, even if 
25. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. 
Ct. 184 (1995); In re Copley Pharmaceutical, Inc., 161 F.R.D. 456 (D. Wyo. 1995). 
26. See generally Francis E. McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73 TEXAS 
L. REV. 1821 (1995). 
27. See, e.g., In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 
F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that certification of the settlement class requires compliance 
with all provisions of Rule 23); see also William W Schwarzer, Settlement of Mass Tort Class 
Actions: Order out of Chaos, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 837 (1995) (suggesting a possible revision 
of Rule 23(e) to spell out factors relevant to whether a class-action settlement should be 
approved). 
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neither the enabling nor the claim aggregation rationale apply. In 
some types of litigation, such as institutional-reform or discrimina-
tion cases, common questions may predominate enough to permit 
quicker and more economical adjudication by means of a class ac-
tion, especially when the only relief sought is injunctive. Opt-out 
rights and protection against claim preclusion are relatively unim-
portant here, while res judicata and consistency of outcomes are 
desired objectives. Public policy favoring private enforcement of 
regulatory schemes may reenforce the rationale for the use of class 
actions in such cases and also in others, including securities, anti-
trust, environmental, and statutory-benefits litigation. 
III. REVISING RULE 23 
This brief overview suggests that for optimum results, a class-
action rule should function differently depending on the purpose 
for which it is invoked. A rule that works well as an enabling de-
vice would not necessarily work well as an aggregation device, and 
one designed for aggregation would not necessarily further efficient 
litigation management. That is not to say that an effective class-
action rule cannot be transsubstantive. But the preceding discus-
sion suggests that in light of the different characteristics of class ac-
tions, essential components of a class-action regime may differ, 
without regard to the underlying substantive law.2s 
· It seems fair to ask, therefore, whether a single, generic class-
action rule can be expected to serve such diverse purposes well. A 
class-action rule is not simply a rule of the road; it is a means for 
allocating power and responsibility among the participants in the 
litigation - imposing a system of checks and balances. Thus, a 
named plaintiff has the power to litigate the claim as the represen-
tative of the class members and the responsibility to act as a fiduci-
ary for the class. The class members, in turn, have some power to 
frustrate the representative litigation, at least to exit from it. Attor-
neys have the power to act for a large group of unseen clients, with 
little or no consultation, but bear commensurate responsibility to 
represent them fairly and adequately. The court has extensive 
power to structure and manage the litigation and also large respon-
sibilities in looking after the interests of absent, albeit represented, 
parties. For best results; the way in which powers and responsibili-
ties are allocated and checks and balances imposed perhaps ought 
28. I do not mean to suggest that bright lines create distinct categories of class actions, 
but, in most instances, the characteristics of the litigation will be sufficiently clear to point 
toward the appropriate treatment. 
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to differ depending on the nature of the class action. The more 
specifically the Rule is written to address an intended purpose, the 
better it will serve that purpose - not only because of the explicit 
direction it will provide the participants in the process, but also be-
cause the drafters, to write specifically, will have had to think in 
specifics rather than in generalities. At the same time, however, the 
more specifically the Rule is designed for one purpose, the less util-
ity it will have for others. 
At least three approaches to the revision _of Rule 23 have been 
discussed, to which a fourth more modest alternative is added 
here:29 
1) A set of different, substance-based rules for different kinds of class 
actions. 
2) A single rule specifying different procedures for different kinds of 
actions. 
3) A single, management rule for the structuring of multiclaim 
litigation. 
4) An elaboration of the Advisory Committee's note to provide more 
specific guidance for the appropriate application of the existing Rule 
23. 
The first approach would entail the adoption of different rules 
for different categories of actions. Rules specifically tailored for 
use in particular kinds of actions would increase the rules' utility 
and efficiency. But the downside of a multiplicity of class-action 
rules is the potential for satellite litigation over the selection of the 
applicable rule; the different kinds of class actions will never be so 
clearly distinguishable as to preclude all controversy, and some ac-
tions will fall into gray areas between the rules. 
The second approach would be to adopt a single rule specifying 
procedures for different categories of actions, taking into account 
their distinct features. Putting aside the existing 23(b )(1) and (b )(2) 
categories of mandatory class actions, one could envision creating 
perhaps three categories for (b )(3) actions corresponding to the 
three purposes of class actions discussed here. The Rule then 
would require the judge first to determine the applicable category 
by applying the specified criteria and standards prescribed for use 
in connection with the particular category and then to make find-
ings supporting the determination.3o The Rule would offer gui-
29. See, e.g., Nielson, supra note 17, at 483-97. Much of the motivation for the sugges-
tions was to make the Rule more user friendly for mass-tort litigation. 
30. One commentator, pointing out that certification could have a number of different 
goals, such as creating "the most 'manageable' litigating unit, the most efficient process for 
resolving multiple cases, the maximally fair and just set of outcomes consistent with resource 
constraints, or some combination of these," has called for a rule that would "articulate princi-
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dance for establishing procedures, such as those for notice and opt 
out, appropriate for each category. 
A third approach essentially would create a management rule 
for multiclaim litigation as a companion to the present Rule 16. 
Such a rule would call for the judge to establish an appropriate 
structure for the litigation as part of a case-management order in 
multiclaim litigation. In doing so, the court and the parties would 
consider and select from among a range of available alternatives. 
These would include use of representative parties (as under present 
Rule 23), lead cases (to provide information about outcomes suita-
ble to create formulae or grids for the resolution of related claims), 
various forms of consolidation (as under present Rule 42(a)), inter-
vention or joinder, some form of coordination, or other innovative 
alternatives.31 The Rule could provide guidance for the selection 
from among alternatives, identifying their purposes and the factors 
to be considered in making the selection. It could identify appro-
priate safeguards, protecting relevant interests, to be included in a 
case-management order establishing a particular structure. It could 
specify the requisite :findings to support selection of a structure. 
The Rule thus would enable a judge, with the assistance of the par-
ties, to fashion a structure-and-management program best suited 
for the circumstances of the litigation. Its aim would be to use the 
existing rules to make an integrated system for the fair and efficient 
resolution of multiclaim litigation. 
Finally, a more modest approach might be to revise only the 
Advisory Committee's note for Rule 23. The note could explicate 
the different purposes the Rule could serve and the ways in which 
class-action procedures could be adapted to serve best the particu-
lar litigation, as discussed above. The note could assist courts and 
counsel by identifying relevant factors for consideration in making 
discretionary decisions. It could, for example, spell out factors for 
consideration in the determination of whether to approve class-
action settlements.32 It could provide guidance for the application 
of the notice requirement. It might clarify the respective obliga-
tions of counsel in the different roles in which they act in class 
actions. 
pies of general application that will guide trial judge discretion and support meaningful ap-
pellate review of class determinations, but that will also leave room for adapting class actions 
to the circumstances of specific cases." Robert G. Bone, Rule 23 Redux: Empowering the 
Federal Class Action, 14 REv. Lmo. 79, 97, 107 (1994). 
31. See generally Roger H. Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 
CoRNELL L. REv. 779 (1985}. 
32. See supra note 27. 
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Under any of these approaches, the judge of necessity would 
retain broad discretion, perhaps even broader than now. A rule 
intended to further litigation management is most useful when it is 
founded on the court's inherent power to manage the litigation 
before it and contemplates the liberal exercise of that power. But a 
rule under which the court exercises that power to structure multi-
ple claims and design a process for their resolution will tend to have 
a greater impact than rules that are purely procedural "rules of the 
road," not only because of the cumulative effect of multiclaim liti-
gation but also because of the way in which it will affect the resolu-
tion of claims and defenses.33 The consequent dilemma is that as 
the need for judicial discretion - and for creativity and innovation 
- increases with the complexities and demands of multiclaim liti-
gation, the risk of harm from its unguided exercise increases as well. 
Rulemaking must confront this dilemma, which is perhaps 
greatest in the class-action area, regardless of what shape the class-
action rule eventually takes. Rule 23's shortcoming in this respect 
is illustrated by recent decisions in which one court certified a 100-
million-member class of nicotine-dependent smokers while another 
court vacated a certification of a much smaller and more clearly 
defined class of HIV-infected hemophiliacs as a usurpation of 
power.34 A rule of such ambiguity and lack of predictability may 
well increase rather than lighten the burdens of complex litigation. 
To work well, the rule not only must be suited for its intended pur-
pose but also must be capable of being soundly and efficiently ad-
ministered. The trial judge's discretion needs to be complemented 
by guidance defining the bounds within which his orders may oper-
ate; those bounds must be reasonably clear yet also flexible enough 
to permit the court to deal effectively with the litigation. At the 
same time, appellate oversight of the trial judge's exercise of discre-
tion must be appropriately provided for. Just as the exercise of 
trial-court discretion needs to be guided by discemable standards, 
so appellate review needs objective reference points based on com-
pliance with those standards. Unless rulemaking in this sensitive 
area is informed by these considerations, confusion will reign and 
additional cost and delay will be generated. 
33. See In re Repetitive Stress Injury Litig., 11 F.3d 368, 374 (2d Cir. 1993); Malcolm v. 
National Gypsum Co., 995 F.2d 346, 350·52 (2d Cir. 1993) (granting consolidation under 
Rule 42(a)). 
34. Compare Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995) with In 
re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995). 
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Revision of Rule 23 offers opportunities as well as challenges. It 
could result in opening Pandora's box, leading to new uncertainties, 
unintended consequences, and expanded litigation. Attempts to 
adapt the Rule to current circumstances can launch an unending 
process of change as those circumstances keep changing. Yet the 
process of considering possible revisions can be productive, gener-
ating better understanding and useful analysis. So the idea ought 
not to be rejected out of hand without discussion. 
IV. IMPROVING PRACTICE UNDER RULE 23 
One way such discussion could be useful is if it leads to an ex-
amination of the practice under present Rule 23 and consideration 
of ways in which it might be improved. 1\vo approaches to im-
provement suggest themselves: first, avoiding reliance on generali-
ties in the application of the Rule and second, more creative use of 
the superiority analysis under Rule 23(b )(3). 
A. Avoiding Reliance on Generalities in the Application of the 
Rule 
Class-action jurisprudence is guided - and burdened - by 
generalities. Generalities, derived from the text of the Rule and 
court decisions, tend to control such matters as the timing of certifi-
cation motions, the treatment of motions to dismiss, the availability 
of discovery, the nature and timing of notice, and the approval of 
class-action settlements.35 But class actions are not fungible and 
the pretense that they are impairs the utility of Rule 23 and can 
impose unnecessary burdens on the litigation. Although to a lim-
ited extent, the Rule requires the court making a class determina-
tion to consider the differences among class actions, such as the 
interest of class members in individually controlling the prosecution 
or defense of the actions,36 the general principles governing the 
conduct of class actions are not sensitive to those differences. That 
is not to say that courts apply these principles inflexibly. But they 
tend at least to pay lip service to them and often permit them to 
stand in the way of more incisive analysis leading to more effective 
use of the Rule. One way in which practice under Rule 23 could be 
35. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974) ("We find nothing in 
either the language or history of Rule 23 that gives a court any authority to conduct a prelim-
inary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained as 
a class action."); Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 678 (7th Cir. 1981) (requiring identification of 
class members before giving of class notice), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 917 (1982). 
36. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(A)·(D). 
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improved is by frankly acknowledging the differences in the pur-
poses served by different categories of class actions whenever they 
are relevant to procedure under the Rule and adapting that proce-
dure to serve best the purpose of class-action treatment in the par-
ticular litigation. Here are some illustrations: 
{1) Tuning of certification motions: Rule 23{c)(1) directs the court to 
make the class-action determination "as soon as practicable." Courts 
often read this as requiring that it be made at an early date. Courts 
ought to consider a less wooden approach, taking into consideration 
relevant factors that should control timing, such as whether deferring 
certification would prejudice putative class members, whether it could 
lead to substantial duplicative activity and unnecessary expense, 
whether it could interfere \vith consideration of preferable and less 
costly alternatives to a class action, and whether instead it would per-
mit further development of the record leading to a more informed 
decision.37 The impact of such factors will vary depending on the 
kind of class action. 
(2) Conduct of discovery: The general principle that discovery nor-
mally should not be directed at class members, particularly before 
certification, does not apply with equal force to all class actions. 
While it has merit in small-claims actions, it may be inappropriate in 
mass-tort litigation or when the typicality of claims may be in ques-
tion, as in discrimination cases. Thus, in some cases, before the court 
can decide whether common issues predominate, it may need exten-
sive information obtainable only through discovery of plaintiffs. 
(3) Precertification consideration of the merits: The related principle 
that the court should not assess the merits of the action before acting 
on certification similarly ought to be regarded as fiexible.38 One of 
the emerging realities of class-action practice is that it focuses largely 
on the pretrial phase, with little attention to trial and adjudication. It 
is doubtful whether most parties to class actions, especially in mass-
tort cases, seriously contemplate a trial, viewing the Rule mainly as a 
vehicle for settlement.39 As a result, practice under the Rule can be-
come distorted and lead to abuse of the Rule. Superiority analysis 
under Rule 23{b )(3) would be more focused and class-action practice 
more orderly if courts, in making decisions on certification and proce-
dure, took into account the merits of the action when doing so would 
be helpful and appropriate. 
37. See Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 
(1974) (postponing class certification until trial of lead plaintiff's individual claim); Perez v. 
Government of Virgin Islands, 109 F.R.D. 384 (D.V.I. 1986) (same). 
38. Cf. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177. But see Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., 573 F.2d 309 (5th 
Cir. 1978) (holding that certification ruling premature when necessary discovery had been 
precluded). 
39. Few mass-tort class actions have gone to trial as class actions. Cf. In re Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51F.3d1293 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.184 (1995) (contemplating 
a trial of common issues eventuating in special verdicts, not final judgments, that might then 
be used in later filed actions in various state or federal courts). 
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( 4) Precertification motion practice: Closely related is the reluctance 
of many courts to entertain dispositive motions before certification. 
While care must be taken to protect the rights of putative class mem-
bers, early motions can assist in the efficient handling of class actions 
and should not be ruled out. 
(5) Notice and opt out: As previously discussed, the importance of 
notice and opt-out rights differs depending on the nature of the class 
action. Courts should look at the circumstances of each case in fash-
ioning an appropriate procedure. 
(6) Considering alternatives to a class action: Though the Rule re-
quires that the court, before certifying a 23(b )(3) action, find that "a 
class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and 
efficient adjudication of the controversy," courts rarely if ever give 
much consideration at the certification stage to how class-action treat-
ment compares with other structuring alternatives available under the 
Federal Rules. Reference to superiority necessarily calls for an an-
swer to the question: Superior to what? As discussed below, courts 
should look, not only at the alternative of denying class certification, 
but also at the range of alternatives available for structuring mul-
ticlaim litigation. 
B. Creative Use of the Superiority Analysis Under Rule 23 (b) (3) 
Taking seriously the requirement of a finding that class-action 
treatment would be "superior" to other available methods of adju-
dication may improve the administration of the Rule. As the court 
said in Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., "The superiority finding re-
quires at a minimum ... an informed consideration of alternative 
available methods of adjudication of each issue."40 These alterna-
tives "are hardly confined to the class action, on the one side, and 
individual uncoordinated lawsuits, on the other."41 The earlier dis-
cussion of a litigation-management rule as an alternative to the 
present Rule noted the various structuring alternatives available 
under the Federal Rules. Greater attention to the "superiority" 
analysis under the existing Rule might help turn Rule 23 into a "vir-
tual" management rule, encouraging consideration by the judge of 
40. Katz, 496 F.2d at 757. 
41. Kaplan, supra note 3, at 390-91 (citing Judge Jack Weinstein's discussion in Revision 
of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 BUFF. L. REV. 433, 438-54 (1960)). 
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alternatives to class actions for the optimum structuring of the par-
ticular litigation.42 Here are alternatives a court might consider: 
(1) Consolidation of claims and selection of lead or test cases for trial 
under Rule 42(a).43 
·(2) Severing common issues for trial under Rule 42(b).44 
(3) In mass-tort litigation, limiting classes to a single state (to avoid 
choice-of-law and due-process problems) and excluding plaintiffs in 
actions pending in state courts (to avoid interference with those 
actions). 
( 4) In small-claims class actions, calibrating the notice requirement 
and providing a procedure for opt ins or one-way intervention, either 
postjudgment or postsettlement. 
(5) Permitting intervention, for example, by a government-
enforcement agency, in an individual plaintiff's case (avoiding the 
need for class treatment).45 
(6) Limiting the remedy to injunctive relief rendering class action 
superfluous. 46 
These are examples. They reveal no stunning innovations; to 
the contrary, they may represent a return to basics, reflecting the 
intellectual underpinnings of the current Rule. They may help re-
mind courts faced with a motion to certify a class that they are not 
limited to an up-or-down response nor are they bound by the for-
mat counsel has presented or by perceived rigid rules governing the 
class-action regime. Whether the purpose is facilitation, aggrega-
tion, or efficiency and economy, the Federal Rules, taken as a 
whole, offer opportunities for sound and creative management. 
42. The Advisory Committee's note recommends that "the court with the aid of the par-
ties ought to assess the relative advantages of alternative procedures for handling the total 
controversy." Advisory Committee Note, supra note 2, 39 F.R.D. at 103. 
43. Test cases were found to be superior in Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974) (involving a truth-in-lending claim where a defendant 
was bound by one-way estoppel); Perez v. Government of Virgin Islands, 109 F.R.D. 384 
(D.V.I. 1986) (involving insureds of defunct insurance company who sued government for 
negligent supervision); see also Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, 51 F.3d at 1293; Cimino v. Raymark 
Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (using statistical sampling to determine awards 
in cases); Advisory Committee Note, supra note 2, 39 F.R.D. at 103; Michael J. Saks & Peter 
David Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling in 
the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REv. 815 (1992). 
44. See Maenner v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 127 F.R.D. 488, 490-92 (W.D. Mich. 
1989) (severing liability issues for separate trial before adjudication of class members' indi-
vidual damage claims); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 98 F.R.D. 254, 268-69 (D. 
Del. 1983) (severing dispute over interpretation of decree for trial before adjudication of 
class members' individual claims). 
45. See Stuart v. Hewlett Packard Co., 66 F.R.D. 73 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (finding interven-
tion by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to avoid manageability problems of 
class action). 
46. See Ferguson v. Housing Auth., 499 F. Supp. 334 (E.D. Ky. 1980) (involving an action 
by public-housing tenants challenging eviction policy of a housing authority). 
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CONCLUSION 
Where then should we go from here? One is reminded of a say-
ing: If you don't know where you are going, all roads lead there. 
Rule 23 is not perfect, but it makes little sense to revise it unless 
one first identifies the defects that need fixing and determines how 
to fix them without creating new ones. Trying to make the Rule 
work better for one purpose may impair it for others. 
That is not to say that a close study of the Rule is not in order. 
Such a study might well begin with a searching examination of how 
the Rule is now being used. The results of such an examination 
might lead to the conclusion that the need for revision is not press-
ing. It might show, for example, that recent decisions provide ade-
quate guidance for the appropriate administration of class-action 
settlements. 
Perhaps the most serious problem with the present Rule is its 
lack of predictability. How the Rule is applied from case to case 
seems largely to be a matter of the length of the chancellor's foot. 
Indeed, some see Rule 23 as a rule of equity. It is inevitable that 
the management of multiclaim litigation calls for a large measure of 
judicial discretion; it surely invokes the judge's experience, judg-
ment, and, one hopes, common sense. But a lack of unifying princi-
ples in the administration of the Rule undermines its effectiveness 
and public confidence in the system. While these issues ought to be 
faced frankly, there is no obvious answer. It would certainly help, 
however, if judges supported their rulings with clearly articulated 
reasons. 
In the end, what is done about Rule 23 should be informed by 
the overall objective of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: "[T]o 
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every ac-
tion. "47 If the rising cost of resolving individual claims in federal 
courts and the pressures of mass litigation are not to frustrate this 
worthy objective, wise use should be made of the available range of 
litigation structures, of which class actions are only one. Adapting 
such structures and making them work requires resolution of the 
tensions between the interest in individual justice and the interest in 
efficiency. While individual justice ought not to be sacrificed to ef-
ficiency, without efficiency individual justice may be lost.4B 
47. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
48. See generally JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MAss TORT LmGATION 
(1995); Judith Resnik et al., Individuals Within the Aggregate: Representation and Fees 
(Apr. 6, 1995) (unpublished paper prepared for Research Conference on Class Actions, on 
file with the New York University School of Law). 
